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The Significance of the European Investment Bank 
 
Maria L. Pisaneschi 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 Since the implementation of the Treaty of Rome in 1958, the Common 
Market of six European states has grown to the European Union of twenty-
five states as of May 2004.  From the outset, the integration of these states 
into a single economic system has made more apparent the differences in 
levels of economic development among and within the member states. The 
original members of the Common Market were aware of these regional 
differences in 1958 and created the European Investment Bank as part of the 
Treaty of Rome to provide investment funds to reduce the development gap 
among the member states. 
 This thesis assesses the extent to which the European Investment 
Bank has contributed to closing this gap. An analysis of its lending to the 
fifteen member countries of the European Union between 1995 and 2001 
establishes that the economic development gap has not been reduced and 
that the lending policies of the EIB have not significantly contributed to 
solving differences in levels of development among these member states.  
Examining the GDP of the member nations during this time period reveals 
that the EIB has been unable to spur economic growth and close the 
development gap. Particular attention is paid to those member states who 
received the greatest percentage of EIB lending. 
 iii
Chapter One 
The European Investment Bank 
 
 
Introduction 
 
What is the significance of the European Investment Bank as a 
developmental tool for the European Union?  What impacts have its activities 
had on the development gap among and within the European Union member 
states?  Research on the EIB and its lending practices can demonstrate the 
effectiveness or significance of the EIB in the development of the EU 
economic community. 
Frederick S. Dunn defines international relations as the actual relations 
that take place across national boundaries or as the body of knowledge that 
we have of those relations at any given time (Dougherty and Pflazgraff 
1990).  The integration of the European states, beginning with the birth of 
the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952, has led to the development 
of many supranational (as well as intergovernmental) institutions, including 
the European Investment Bank (EIB).  The Treaty of Rome created the EIB in 
1958 as a finance institution that will contribute towards the integration, 
balanced development and economic and social cohesion of the member 
nations (European Investment Bank 1999).  The EIB is concerned with 
promoting smooth and balanced development of the member states of the 
European Community, now the European Union (European Investment Bank 
1978).   
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While considered part of the EU, the EIB remains autonomous from other 
institutions of the Union.  The design of the EIB has been for operational 
autonomy within a general legal framework. It has the authority to decide on 
lending operations within the EU, but outside the EU the EIB acts on 
mandates from the Council of Economic and Finance Ministers (Dinan 1998).  
The role of the EIB is one factor to assess in understanding the relationship 
between the international political economy and regional movements such as 
the European Union.  Assessing the lending behavior of the EIB will enhance 
our understanding of how regional development occurs among autonomous 
states that are creating a single economy.  
 The EU is a single market system of 15 European nation-states. There 
are uneven levels of economic development within this single market and 
across and within each of the 15 member states. The expansion of the 
European Union, with the addition of 10 new members in May 2004, will 
create an even larger regional development gap. It was evident from their 
creation of the EIB in the 1958 Treaty of Rome, that the six members of the 
Common Market were already concerned with the issue of uneven levels of 
development among the original members. The issue of uneven regional 
development among and within the member states continued to be an issue 
with each enlargement of the Common Market and later the European Union.  
Each of the six original members joined for political reasons; and each 
subsequent enlargement was also supported for a number of political 
reasons. Yet the consequences of these political decisions were apparent for 
the regional development gap issue. From the outset and thereafter, each 
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enlargement made the development gap among the members and within 
some of the members a more pronounced problem with which the EIB had to 
contend. France was a pivotal country in establishing the Common Market.  
Charles de Gaulle, President of France during this time period, saw the entry 
of France as a positive opportunity both to address development issues 
within his own country as well as for the promotion of his foreign policy goal 
to establish a united Europe under French leadership. The European 
Community offered an opportunity to stabilize the politics of France, 
modernize its economy (establish its agricultural system), and create a 
framework in which to embed Franco-German rapprochement (Dinan 1999).   
French solidified its relationship with Germany when De Gaulle supported the 
French policy of reconciliation and rapprochement.  De Gaulle’s commitment 
to the Treaty of Rome was given in exchange for German support for the 
CAP. De Gaulle’s support was essential for establishing the European 
Community.  His commitment to the original common market was so firm 
that he devalued the franc in 1958, cut government expenditures and 
instituted tax hikes to bolster the French economy to prepare it for the 
impending intra-EC tariff reductions.  De Gaulle also saw the EC as a means 
to improve the French economy.  The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
provided a large market for French agriculture and high prices even when the 
world market prices were lower.  This would give France time to modernize 
its agricultural sector and close the agricultural development gap between 
France and other original members (e.g., German Federal Republic and the 
Netherlands).  
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For several reasons, Britain was not willing to consider signing the 
Treaty of Rome. Instead, it successfully proposed the establishment of the 
European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA) to establish an alternative within 
Europe to the Common Market. EFTA allowed Britain to maintain its 
commonwealth relationships while also enjoying the benefits of special trade 
preferences with other EFTA member states.   Of course, this alternative was 
not welcomed by De Gaulle, who subsequently blocked Britain from entry 
into the Common Market when it did apply several times after 1958. EC 
member nations perceived Britain as deterrent from integration.  Britain 
applied for EC membership in 1967 and again de Gaulle led the opposition to 
the application.  Once again Britain was denied membership into the EC for 
essentially the same reason as before. 
 The first enlargement of the Common Market began with British entry 
negotiations in 1970.  Pompidou, who had replaced DeGaulle, was far more 
willing to consider British entry, especially since the French economy had 
declined relative to that of the German Federal Republic between 1958 and 
1970. Under Pompidou, France was also more supportive of British entry 
because its membership was perceived as a means to ensure a gradual move 
into the European Monetary Union (EMU) that France was so intent on 
establishing.  In fact, Pompidou’s willingness to support British entry went so 
far that he actively supported the creation of the European Regional 
Development Fund (ERDF) which Prime Minister Heath wanted as a promise 
from the other Common market members to assist in closing the agricultural 
and industrial development gaps between Britain and other Common Market 
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member (Dinan 1999). Germany wanted to quicken the pace of EMU and 
viewed enlargement as a deterring from this process.  Britain viewed entry to 
the EU as a means to become a more prosperous nation and obtain greater 
economic development. While its entry into the Common Market would widen 
the regional development gap among the member states, this issue was not 
of central concern when terms of entry were negotiated.   
The fishing and agricultural policy of the EU was of major concern to 
Norway and essentially was the stumbling block to entry.  The Norwegians 
were concerned with EU agricultural and fishing policy as well as their 
fledgling oil industry.  Denmark, like many in Britain, was leery of 
integration. Since Denmark conducted a majority of its trade with Britain, it 
was compelled to apply for entry.  Denmark needed access to Britain’s 
markets and would not have those on equal terms with other common 
market members if it chooses not to apply for entry.  Ireland’s economy was 
tied to Britain more than Denmark thus there was overwhelming support for 
Irish entry into the Common Market. Although Ireland’s economy was linked 
to that of Britain, it was severely underdevelopment. Joining the Common 
Market would only exacerbate the gap in regional development among the 
member states.  The first enlargement consisted of these four countries 
applying for entry, yet only three became members in January 1973. It 
occurred just as the industrialized world, including Europe, began a period of 
economic decline characterized by slow growth and rising inflation (i.e., 
stagflation). This only worsened regional development problems within the 
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Common Market.  Norway’s national referendum did not pass, thus they did 
not choose to join.  
 The second enlargement occurred when Greece joined in 1981.  
Greece had recently returned to a system of democracy.  The addition of 
Greece was seen as a means of combating the institutional decline of the EU.  
Yet the gap in development between Greece and the other members of the 
Common Market clearly made the regional development problem among the 
member states a far more difficult issue to reason. The European Community 
commission president wanted the enlargement to spur the existing EC 
members to begin institutional reforms.  This enlargement resulted in the 
entrance of Greece only. 
 The third enlargement began with entrance negotiations of Spain and 
Portugal.    This enlargement had tremendous economic obstacles to address 
as these countries, like Greece, were extremely poor and also large 
populations.  The EC commission facilitated Portugal entry by providing funds 
to modernize the economy.  France was concerned with agricultural 
competition with accession of Spain and this concern provoked a CAP reform.  
Additionally Greece demanded the EC finalize Integrated Mediterranean 
Programs (IMPs) before concluding enlargement negotiations.  The IMPs 
were financial assistance to not only Greece, but Italy and southern France 
as well.  This assistance was to promote agriculture, small business and 
tourism.  The end result was the member states agreeing to finance the IMPs 
and allocating approximately 30 percent to Greece.  This agreement removed 
the final obstacle to Spain and Portugal entrance, both of whom joined in 
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1986. Clearly the arrangements for their entry pointed out how widespread 
the regional development problem had become within the community. 
 The fourth enlargement occurred after the Maastricht Treaty was 
implemented in November 1993 and renamed the EC the European Union. 
Austria, Finland and Sweden joined in January 1995.  This enlargement was 
seen as strengthening the concepts of democracy and openness.  This 
enlargement extended the Union to the north and increased 
its size by 33 percent.  These countries brought new and different 
perspectives on environmental issues, regional development and investment.  
The accession of these nations occurred very rapidly as their respective 
economies were stronger than most of the existing EU.  Most importantly 
they had already adopted much of EU policy.  The EU wanted to fully 
implement the single market program before another enlargement occurred.  
The European Economic Area was created as an association of the twelve EU 
countries and the seven European Free Trade Association (EFTA) members.  
EFTA included Sweden, Austria and Finland.  The EEA would become the 
largest commercial bloc.   The EEA became a stepping stone to membership 
in the EU. 
 Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and its relations with several 
Eastern European countries in the early 1990s, several former and newly 
formed countries have sought admission to the European Union.  In May 
2004, ten of these countries will be admitted. Their admission to the EU has 
been based on several reasons; but the primary concern has been political. 
Allowing entry has been perceived as a mechanism for ensuring their 
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progress toward democratic practices and the promotion of a market-based 
approach to economic develop. At the same time, and as was already 
experienced by the EU with the reunification of Germany in the mid-1990s, 
their entry will intensify the need to solve problems related to disparities in 
level of economic development among the twenty-five member states.   
Against this brief background, there has been very little research 
conducted on the effectiveness of the EIB in addressing the development gap 
goals of the Common Market, then the European Community, and now the 
European Union.  The EIB was created in 1958 to deal with regional 
development issues among the six member states. Although its mission since 
then has not changed, this brief description of enlargement clearly 
establishes that the politics of enlargement has impacted the extent to which 
the scope of the problem for which the EIB was created has become far more 
extensive and complex since 1958.  This thesis will contribute to 
understanding the effect EIB has had on regional development goals and why 
this effect has occurred. 
The relationship among the EU, regional development and the EIB has not 
been fully analyzed in any scholarly writings.  Literature does exist which 
separately discusses these entities, their goals and structures.  This literature 
will be utilized as the starting point for a more in depth analysis of the 
regional development gap within the EU. 
When discussing the EIB, most literature addresses the area of regional 
development.  The development of transport, telecommunications and 
energy infrastructure has a great impact on the economic growth rates in the 
 8
different regions of the EU (Balchin and Sykora 1999).  Rates of economic 
growth are a primary concern of the EIB, especially in the area of regional 
development. The EIB (1999) requires all projects brought to it for lending 
adhere to one of the following objectives: 
 Foster economic development in less favored regions (balanced 
development) 
 Improve European transport and telecommunications infrastructure 
 Protect the environment 
 Secure energy resources 
 Boost the competitiveness of industry 
 Promote small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) 
 Modernize and extend the infrastructure in the health and education 
sectors 
These objectives of the EIB provide insight into the lending practices and 
procedures of the bank.  What is relevant to the research question is how 
these EIB objectives, particularly economic development have been effective 
in reducing the regional development gap and promoting integration within 
the Union. 
I propose that the European Union member states have not been 
successful in closing the differences in levels of development among 
themselves.  I will test this proposition by completing a case study of the 
European Investment Bank. 
The remainder of chapter one will contain a review of current literature 
regarding the European Investment Bank relevant to the thesis.  The 
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relevant theory of international relations will be briefly identified and the 
sources and method of research that will be utilized in this thesis are named.  
In chapter two I will describe the organization and foundation of the EIB.  I 
will review the treaties and the applicability to the research proposal.  
Chapter three will outline the establishment of the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development and its connection to the research proposal.  
I will review the lending patterns of the EIB in chapter four.  Chapter four is a 
detailed analysis of the financing of EIB lending in relation to the individual 
countries of the European Union.  Finally, in chapter five, I will summarize 
and provide analysis of the case study of the European Investment Bank 
created by earlier chapters.  Chapter five serves as a conclusion to the 
research project and reports the results from testing the research 
proposition. 
Literature Review 
There are three areas of research that are present in the literature 
review that analyze the European Investment Bank.  These areas are EU 
institutional effects, non-EU institutional effects and effects since the 1980’s. 
European Union Institutional Effects 
 
The regional development role of the EIB may also be affected by the 
different kinds of relations it has with various EU institutions. Laffan (1997) 
argues the relationship between the EIB and the Commission of the EU is 
complementary and does not suffer from the interinstitutional rivalry, which 
is prevalent in most of the decision making in the EU.  Laffan supports this 
complementary relationship by noting that two senior directors from the 
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commission serve on the board of directors for the EIB.  However, the 
Commission has created initiatives to address regional development that are 
separate from the EIB.  For instance, the EU established the Cohesion Fund, 
a programming approach for structural spending within the EU. The Treaty 
on European Union (TEU) created the Cohesion Fund for the four poorest 
countries of the union.   It was created as a separate entity, independent 
from another EU program: the European Regional Development Fund (ERFD) 
established in the 1970s in response to demands from the United Kingdom. 
What is the relationship between these programs and the EIB?  The Cohesion 
Fund and the ERFD must be assessed to determine their contributions, as 
compared to those of the EIB, to closing the regional development gap. Are 
these programs compatible with those of the EIB, thereby reflecting a 
harmonious relationship between the EU commission and the EIB on the 
question of regional development?   
Laffan (1997) claims there is an uneasy relationship between the EIB 
and two other EU institutions: the European Parliament and European Court 
of Auditors.  The relatively complementary relationship between the EIB and 
the Commission does not exist between the EIB and the European Parliament 
(EP).  The EP is continually presenting resolutions to ensure adequate 
political monitoring of the borrowing and lending activities of the EU, 
including the EIB (Laffan 1997).  The EP argues that the EIB should be held 
to greater accountability because the EIB manages funds on behalf of the 
community.  The EP also argues that the EIB’s lending activities affect the 
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implementation of structural funds from a budgetary perspective and 
therefore should be monitored (Laffan 1996).   
Along with the EP, the Court of Auditors has had a continued dispute with 
the EIB regarding the process of auditing.  The EIB maintains its own 
auditing structure and does not want the Court to conduct audits.  In 
November 1992, an agreement was signed between the two institutions to 
normalize relations between the institutions and set up a framework for 
auditing. To what extent are the positions of the EP and the Court of Auditors 
factors that effect EIB’s regional development goals? 
Laffan’s analysis suggests that the level of cooperation between the EIB 
and EU institutions varies; but he does not assess how this variation affects 
EIB regional development goals. Do the Commission’s economic goals 
promote greater integration and closure of the regional development gap?  
How do the positions of the EP and the Court of Auditors influence EIB 
operations?  These questions illuminate another avenue of research in this 
subject area. 
Effects of Non-European Union Institutions 
 
Guntar Handl focuses on sustained development in his analysis.  His focus 
is on Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs).  His analysis does not 
specifically discuss the EIB; however it does mention the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).    
The EBRD began operating in April 1991 and is not an institution of the 
EU, but the member states had a key role in its development.  It is the 4th 
largest major area-based development bank (Jones 1996).  It is part 
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development bank and part investment bank.  Its starting capital came from 
EU and non-EU states as well as several non-European states.  ERBD 
members include the EIB and the European Commission, which have both 
contributed to its capital base.  Much criticism has ensued since its inception 
as it appears to duplicate the role of the World Bank and the EIB.   
 Handl calls for a mandate to ensure that MDBs funding for development 
contribute to the economic growth, social development and environmental 
protection in the context of sustainable development (Handl 1998). 
Sustained development has become one of (in Handl’s opinion) crucial 
elements in MDBs.  He praises the EBRD for its agreement that directs the 
Bank to “promote in the full range of its activities environmentally sound and 
sustainable development (Handl 1998)”.  Although not necessarily concerned 
with the regional development gap, but rather sustainable development, this 
analysis brings forth the concept of MDBs becoming politically involved in a 
nation’s development.  How does the concept of sustainable development 
and political involvement within nations affect EIB efforts to address regional 
development? 
The Effect of Developments since the 1980s on EIB Regional 
Development Activities 
 
 An examination of the expanded roles of the EIB will be researched to 
determine the effectiveness of the EIB’s ability to address the regional 
development gap in the face of its expanding role.  Dinan (1999) provides a 
straightforward description of the EIB and its structure but also identifies four 
developments within the EU during the 1980’s and 1990’s that increased the 
role of the EIB in addressing EU issues: 
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 Single market program increased demand for loans to improve EU 
infrastructure to increase industrial competitiveness. 
 Single European Act lead to an emphasis on projects in the area of 
regional development 
 German unification resulted in increased demand for EIB financing for 
environmental programs 
 The need for assistance in Central and Eastern Europe has led to the 
EIB including these areas in their financing programs 
 
The Single European Act of 1986 did not alter the structure of the bank, 
but the Act is instrumental in understanding the theme of unification. 
However, this role is not discussed in detail in Coombes and Rees analysis. 
The analysis of Coombes and Rees, Balchin and Sykora and regional 
development policy in the EU provides the groundwork for determining the 
economic goals of the EU particularly in the area of regional development.  
Coombes and Rees argue that the increased activity in the Community’s 
regional and social policies during 1989 and 1990 reflect the new emphasis 
on economic and social cohesion.  This activity includes (Coombes and Rees 
1991): 
1. Many decisions were approved by the community to reform and 
expand structural funds with important new procedures involving 
long-term support frameworks for individual states, regional 
development programs from different community funding sources 
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and intensified consultation and control by the commission in this 
area. 
2. A Social Charter was adopted to define basic rights for people 
throughout the community. 
The increased role of the EIB, as indicated, has resulted in an increased 
lending base for the bank. These developments touch briefly on the ongoing 
relationship between the EIB and the EU, and regional development. Further 
study of these developments will indicate how the lending policies of the EIB 
have affected the EU in reaching regional development goals and whether the 
EIB has been effective in promoting integration within the European Union 
through its lending practices.  
The Amsterdam Treaty signed in the latter part of the 1990s has also 
affected the role of the EIB. That treaty gave authority to the EIB to lend 
money for health and education projects as well as provide risk capital for 
small and medium sized enterprises (Osborn 1999).  However, these new 
roles were not intended to replace the primary focus of the bank on balanced 
regional development.  Osborn (1999) argues the new roles established in 
the Amsterdam Treaty were created as a result of the EU’s inability to 
generate a plan for job creation without weakening the fiscal controls 
required to meet the deadlines for The European Monetary Union (EMU) in 
1999.  In addition, Osborn (1999) argues the EIB will be instrumental in 
easing the conversion to the single currency, the Euro.  Osborn’s 
observations also reveal the relationship that exists between the EIB and the 
EU.  The addition of other nations to the EU is dependent on the ability of the 
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EIB to address the economic disparities of candidate nations.  The EU will not 
allow admission of a member nation that could be a categorized as a 
“burden” to the economic system of the Union.  The utilization of the EIB by 
the EU may indicate one approach (in terms of regional development) of 
these organizations; however, further research will be required to determine 
applicability to the research question. 
Zysman and Schwartz examine European unification in light of a changed 
world economy, specifically focusing on the industrial integration of Central 
and Eastern Europe into the broader European economy.  They argue that for 
two generations the EU has sought to create a single market from the 
economies of a set of similar political economies, a homogeneous economic 
space established by a policy-driven convergence of market rules (Zysman 
and Schwartz 1998).  The basis of their analysis is a comparison to the tiers 
of economic development in Asia and a focus on international production 
networks.  This analysis calls for a reorganization of production to promote 
integration, a redivision of labor (Zysman and Schwartz 1998). 
Although their focus is on Asia and production, several points are 
revealed that are important to gaps in regional development and the EU 
member states: (Zysman and Schwartz 1998)  
• The range of incomes, wages and skills in Europe was very 
compressed or specialized by region prior to integration. 
• With the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold 
War, the range of wage and technological capacities has been 
dramatically extended in regions of Europe.   
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• The goal of the EU is to create a homogeneous economic 
environment. 
• Europe has become a much more economically heterogeneous 
region, thus creating a larger development gap. 
 
Zysman and Schwartz argue Multinational Corporations (MNCs) will be 
more involved in Central and Eastern European development.  The EIB has 
been shown to be involved in capital investments in these areas of Europe.  
The emergence of MNCs will affect EIB lending policies. 
Zysman and Schwartz find that the increased development in the areas of 
transport, telecommunications and energy infrastructures will greatly impact 
the rates of regional economic growth.  A regional development gap resulted 
in Central and Eastern Europe and it was not until the early 1990’s that this 
imbalance was addressed.   They argue the trans-European networks (TENs) 
were created after the Treaty of Maastricht in 1991, in an effort to facilitate 
multi-mode connections with the peripheral regions and to assist in the 
development of a single market (Zysman and Schwartz 1998).  Development 
of transport, telecommunications and energy TENs are imperative, according 
to Zysman and Schwartz, for the development of a Single European Market.  
They were unable to judge whether TENs have been effective in reducing the 
regional development gap. 
 Relevant Theories 
Neofunctionalism grew out of the theory of functionalism in the 1950’s.   
It was developed to explain integration on a regional scale (Jones 1996).  
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Functionalism was based on the view that regionalism could be built from the 
ground up by focusing on particular economic problems and solutions to 
those problems. By contrast, neofunctionalism emphasizes the political 
processes that lead to regional integration through the attainment of 
economic goals (Wood and Yelilada 1996).  The EIB is a political institution, 
comprised of elites from various European nations. It interacts with various 
EU institutions.  The relationship among these elites, the EU institutions, and 
the EIB is important in determining the effectiveness of the EIB in influencing 
the regional development gap. Therefore, I expect that the results of a case 
study on the EIB will best be explained by neofunctionalist theory of 
integration.  
 
Sources and Methods of Research 
 
 I will review the lending of the EIB from its beginning to 2001 and the 
ERDF from 1991 to 2001.  Review of the ERDF will be used to support of the 
existence of a regional development gap. These are the two organizations 
within the European Union active in addressing the development gap among 
EU member states.  I will then offer a detailed analysis of EIB lending from 
1995 to 2001 concerning what each EU member state was lent and for what 
projects.  
 The data required for this research are readily available from the EIB 
including annual reports, annual brochures, EIB economic research papers 
compiled by EIB staff, external scholars and specialists, technical reports on 
loan projects, and other miscellaneous publications.  The other institutions of 
the European Union also have data readily available, including annual 
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reports, budget reports and treaty information.  In addition, scholarly 
journals, including (but not limited to) The Journal of Common Market 
Studies, International Organization, European Economic Review, The 
American Journal of International Law and Regional Studies will be a valuable 
resource of pertinent information.  I will also provide evidence about changes 
in the development gap across member states (and within member states 
where appropriate). 
 The primary sources (treaties, annual reports, etc) will be analyzed to 
establish trends in the lending practices of the EIB and the regional 
development gap.  Secondary resources will be utilized as supporting 
evidence of patterns observed in the primary sources.  The end result will be 
a predominately qualitative research piece; however, budget analysis will 
lead to some quantitative results.  This will allow examination of what, if any, 
relationship there may be between the EIB lending and changes in the 
development gap among EU member states. 
 This is a case study based primarily on quantitative and qualitative 
resources.  The case study is a historical analysis that identifies changes that 
have occurred in the treaty status of the EIB and the lending practices of the 
EIB.  The case study is presented in chapters two, three and four.  Chapter 
three regarding the EBRD illuminates several points that relate to the 
proposition.  The EBRD represents an effort of the European Union to address 
the growing concern for the regional development gap occurring in Europe.  
The EBRD is similar in structure to the EIB; however, its membership is not 
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limited to the EU.  It also includes non-members.  A general overview of the 
EBRD is added to the case study to reinforce the concept of a growing 
regional development gap in Europe. 
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Chapter Two 
The Legal Organization of The European Investment Bank 
 
Introduction 
The European Investment Bank (EIB) originated with the Treaty of 
Rome in 1957.  The Treaty of Rome established the European Community 
and was written by the following countries:  Belgium, Germany (at this time 
considered West Germany), France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.  
These countries would later be referred to as “member nations”.  The EIB is 
an autonomous financial institution established by articles 129 and 130 of the 
Treaty of Rome (Dinan 323). 
A historical perspective of the EIB may be achieved by examining 
various European Union documents.  Beginning with its inception with the 
Treaty of Rome through the most current treaty, the Treaty of Nice, the 
development of the bank can be traced.  This development includes the legal 
basis for the bank and its capital base. 
The Treaty of Rome 
 
 The Treaty of Rome (Article 267) defines the task of the European 
Investment Bank is to contribute to a balanced and steady development of 
the common market in the interest of the entire European Community.  The 
EIB will provide financing for specific projects based on the following criteria: 
1) A project for developing less developed regions. 
2) A project for modernization or conversion to the establishment of 
the common market and those projects, which would be too large 
for a single member country to finance. 
 21
3) Projects of common interest to several member nations which due 
to size or nature are unable to be financed by means available in 
individual member states. 
 
The Treaty of Rome also dictates that members of the EIB would be 
the member states themselves.  The Statute of The European Investment 
Bank is established by a Protocol annexed to this Treaty.   
Protocol for Establishing the European Investment Bank 
 The Protocol for establishing the European Investment Bank is detailed 
in Appendix A.  This protocol establishes the banks mandate of regional 
development.    The protocol is a detailed document outlining the authority 
and responsibilities of the EIB.  The most critical article of the protocol in 
terms of this research is Article 2 that defines the task of the bank in Article 
267 of the Treaty of Rome.  This article essentially defines the mandate of 
the European Investment Bank as promoting and contributing to a balanced 
development of the common market in the interest of the entire European 
Community.   An assessment of GDP will be used to assess if the EIB has 
fulfilled this task as established in the Protocol.  The Protocol develops 
criteria for the lending procedures of the bank.  One of the fundamental 
criteria is lending for projects in less developed regions.  This is directly 
related to the research question. The attached Appendix A provides the 
detailed tasks of the bank.  The Protocol reveals the reasoning of the EU for 
developing the EIB by presenting the criteria necessary for EIB funding.  The 
structure of the EIB as offered by the Protocol indicates the involvement of 
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the EU.  The Bank directors are selected by nominations from the member 
nations.  Thus concerns of the Bank would be EU related.  Article 18 does 
provide provisions for investment outside the EU but only when authorized 
by the Board of Governors acting on proposals from the Board of Directors.  
Article 20 specifically addresses the operating principles that require all loans 
or grants to promote the goal of the common market.  This denotes the 
overall theme of the EIB.   The Protocol establishes the audit process for the 
Bank, which is internal by a committee of three appointed by the Board of 
Governors.  This testifies to the autonomy of the EIB from outside 
institutions.  The Protocol serves as an in depth definition of the EIB that was 
created by Article 267 of The Treaty of Rome. 
 
Single European Act 
 
 This Act was signed in February 1986, but did not come into force until 
July 1987.  This act makes no special provisions or changes in regard to the 
European Investment Bank.  The main theme of the Act is cooperation.  The 
Act redefines the powers of the Commission in regards to the implementation 
of progress towards European unity.  A major focus of the Act is the 
development of the internal market and a general movement toward a 
European Union. 
 The Act also included items regarding political cooperation, common 
policies and community interests.  However, this Act does not alter the 
structure of the European Investment but rather institutes a progression 
towards a European Union. 
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The Treaty on European Union 
 
 The Treaty on European Union (TEU) was signed in February 1992 and 
was primarily concerned with establishing the European Union founded on 
the existing European Communities.  Again, there are no specific references 
to the EIB.  TEU is primarily focused on the attainment of common foreign, 
security policies and international cooperation. 
 The TEU redefines the roles of the European Council, the President, the 
Commission, the Parliament and the Court of Justice in implementing the 
concept of Union.   The adjustments to the established European 
Communities include budget adjustments and common action among the 
Member States in regards to police actions. 
 Articles 40 and 43 of the TEU are perhaps the only items that may be 
related to the EIB, but not specifically stated.  These articles allow Member 
States the opportunity to make use of institutions, procedures and 
mechanisms of The Treaties (starting with the Treaty of Rome to present) to 
create closer cooperation with other Member States and furthering the 
objectives of the Union.  Although the EIB is not stated specifically in the 
Articles, it may be inferred from the idea of institutions. 
The Statute of the European Investment Bank 
 
 The 1999 version of the Statue is very similar to the Protocol that 
establishes the Bank.  The most notable change is in Article 4, which 
increases the capital of the Bank to one hundred billion Euros and changes 
the subscribed rates of the Member states to reflect this capital: 
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 Table 1: New Subscribed Capital Rates Converted to Euro 
Germany 17,766,355,000 
France 17,766,355,000 
Italy 17,766,355,000 
United Kingdom 17,766,355,000 
Spain 6,530,656,000 
Belgium 4,924,710,000 
Netherlands 4,924,710,000 
Sweden 3,267,057,000 
Denmark 2,493,522,000 
Austria 2,444,649,000 
Finland 1,404,544,000 
Greece 1,335,817,000 
Portugal 860,858,000 
Ireland 623,380,000 
Luxembourg 124,677,000 
 
This Article also indicates the change from the ECU as the unit of 
account to the Euro.  Article 5 is amended to change the average amount of 
the subscribed capital to be paid to 6 percent from 7.50162895 percent as 
originally dictated by The Treaty of Rome.  Article 13 is amended to increase 
the number of Vice Presidents from six to seven on the Management 
Committee. 
 
The Treaty of Nice 
  
 These amendments to TEU were developed in October 2001 in Nice 
and compiled into The Treaty of Nice and protocols.  This treaty was ratified 
by the EU in February 2003.  These amendments are not concerned with the 
EIB but rather developing consistency in Union policies. 
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The Treaty of Nice is concerned primarily with voting rights and 
enhancing cooperation among the Member States.  A recurrent theme in this 
treaty as well as previous treaties is a common foreign policy and common 
security policy.  The Treaty of Nice does replace Article 43 of the TEU, but it 
essentially remains the same.  
In conclusion, with the exception of a few minor changes with the 
1999 Statute, the European Investment Bank has remained unchanged from 
its inception with the Treaty of Rome in 1957.  The review of The Treaty of 
Rome describes the Bank and its role in The European Union.  Study of other 
European Union documents since the Treaty of Rome illustrates the minor 
changes the bank has undergone since 1957.  The minor changes that have 
occurred since 1957 do not alter the original task of the bank, which is 
central to the research. 
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Chapter 3 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
 
Introduction 
 
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) was 
established in 1991.  At that time communism was failing in Central and 
Eastern Europe.  The EBRD was created to assist these countries in 
developing market economies and democracies.  The EBRD is committed to 
the fundamental principles of multi-party democracy.  The mandate of the 
bank is to foster the transition towards open market-oriented economies and 
to promote private and entrepreneurial initiatives in the countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe (EBRD 1991).  The principal office of the Bank is located 
in London, England; however it may establish branch offices in any territory 
of members of the Bank.  The functions of the EBRD include fostering the 
transition of Central and Eastern European countries toward open market-
oriented economies and the promotion of private and entrepreneurial 
initiatives, encourage the development of capital markets, give support to 
economically viable projects involving more than one recipient member 
country, promote activities that are environmentally sound and those 
promoting sustainable development.  Membership in the bank is open to 
European countries, members of the European Economic Community (EEC), 
members of the European Investment Bank (EIB) and those non-European 
countries that are currently members of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF).  Members can also be admitted by a three-fourths majority vote of no 
less than two-thirds of the bank’s Board of Governors. 
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The capital stock of the bank has been set at ten thousand million ECU 
and is divided into one million shares with a value of ten thousand ECU each.  
This authorized capital stock may increase or decrease by a two-thirds vote 
of the Board of Governors.  The Board must review the capital stock of the 
bank at least once every five years to determine whether an increase or 
decrease may be necessary.  Payment of the paid in shares of bank members 
shall be made in five installments of twenty percent of the subscription 
amount, these installment payments are to begin no later than sixty days 
after membership entry.  Capital resources for bank operations include these 
capital shares of members as well as funds raised by borrowing, repayment 
of loans, investments and any other funds or income received by the bank.  
The bank may charge commissions or fees in addition to interest received for 
loans it has granted.  
The methods of operation for achieving the functions or mandate of 
the bank include (EBRD 1991): 
1. Banks or interested sources, loans to state-owned enterprises 
operating competitively and moving towards participation in the 
market economy or loads to aide in the facilitation of these 
enterprises into private control. 
 
2. Investment in equity capital of private sector enterprises. 
3. Investment in the equity capital of any state-owned enterprise 
operating Making or co-financing with other multilateral 
institutions, commercial competitively and moving to participation 
in a market oriented economy. 
 
4. Underwriting where financing is not appropriate. 
5. Facilitation of access to domestic and international capital markets 
for private enterprises. 
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6. Providing loans for technical assistance for reconstruction or 
development of infrastructure. 
 
7. Deploying Special Funds and determining the use of these funds. 
 The structure of the bank consists of a Board of Governors, a Board of 
Directors, a President, at least one Vice-President and any other officers 
deemed necessary.  Each member of the EBRD appoints one governor and 
one alternate. The powers of the Board of Governors include (EBRD 1991): 
1. Admission of new members or determination of conditions of 
entry. 
 
2. Increase or decrease capital stock of bank. 
3. Suspend a member, if necessary. 
4. Decide on appeals from interpretations or applications of the 
agreement of the bank by the Board of Directors. 
   
5. Authorize the conclusion of general agreements. 
 
6. Elect the Directors and President of the Bank. 
 
7. Determine the salary and other terms of the contract of service 
of the president and the remuneration of the Directors and 
Alternate Directors. 
 
8. Approve the general balance sheet and the profit and loss 
statements after reviewing the auditor’s report. 
 
9. Determine the reserves and the allocation and distribution of the 
net profits of the bank. 
 
10. Amend the agreement establishing the ERBD. 
 
11. Decide to terminate the bank operations and liquidate the 
assets. 
 
12. Exercise the powers of the Board of Governors as expressed in 
the establishing agreement. 
 
The Board of Governors holds an annual meeting or additional meetings if 
required to fulfill the duties to conduct the business of the EBRD.   
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 The Board of Directors or members of the bank whose voting power is 
greater than one quarter of the voting power of the bank can request a 
meeting.  All regulations and decisions must pass the Board of Directors by a 
majority of no less then two-thirds of the voting power.   
 The Board of Directors is comprised of twenty-three (23) members 
who are not members of the Board of Governors.  Eleven (11) of the 
directors are elected by the Governors representing Belgium, Denmark, 
France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, the 
European Economic Community and the European Investment Bank.  Four 
(4) are elected by Governors representing countries in Central and Eastern 
Europe that are eligible for assistance from the EBRD.  Four (4) are elected 
by Governors representing other European countries and four (4) are elected 
by Governors representing non-European countries.  Thus, the Board of 
Directors is elected by the Board of Governors.  The powers of the Board of 
Directors are minimal and include preparing the work for the Board of 
Governors, establishing policies concerning loans, guarantees, investments, 
borrowing of the Bank and technical assistance on the operations of the Bank 
(EBRD 1991).  The Board of Directors also approves the budget of the Bank 
and submits the audited accounts of each financial year to the Board of 
Governors (EBRD 1991).  The Board of Directors functions as the principal 
office of the bank and meets as necessary to conduct the business of the 
bank.  A majority of the Directors constitutes the quorum for any decisions of 
the Board. 
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 The President of the EBRD is elected by the Board of Governors   for a 
term of four (4) years and is eligible for re-election (EBRD 1991).  The 
President is the legal representative of the Bank and is responsible, as the 
chief of staff, for the organization, appointment and dismissal of the officers 
of the Bank.   In addition to these duties, the President also chairs the 
meetings of the Board of Directors and under their direction conducts the 
current business of the bank. 
 One or more Vice-Presidents are appointed by the Board of Directors 
based on recommendations of the President of the Bank.  The Vice-President 
may participate in meetings of Board of Directors but has no voting 
authority. In the event of the incapacity or absence of the President, the 
Vice-President becomes the acting President of the Bank including voting 
privileges within the Board of Directors. 
The following table presents the initial capital subscription amounts 
and shares allocated to member nations. 
Table 2: Initial Subscribed Capital of the European Bank for   
   Reconstruction and Development 
 
European Communities Number of 
Shares 
Capital 
Subscription in 
million ECU 
Belgium 22,800 228.00 
Denmark 12,000 120.00 
France 85,175 851.75 
Germany, Federal Republic of 85,175 851.75 
Greece 6,500 65.00 
Ireland 3,000 30.00 
Italy 85,175 851.75 
Luxembourg 2,000 20.00 
Netherlands 24,00 248.00 
Portugal 4,200 42.00 
Spain 34,00 340.00 
United Kingdom 85,175 851.75 
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European Economic Community 30,000 300.00 
European Investment Bank 30,000 300.00 
Austria 22,800 228.00 
Cyprus 1,000 10.00 
Finland 12,500 125.00 
Iceland 1,000 10.00 
Israel 6,500 65.00 
Liechtenstein 200 2.00 
Malta 100 1.00 
Norway 12,500 125.00 
Sweden 22,800 228.00 
Switzerland 11,500 228.00 
Turkey 7,900 115.00 
Bulgaria 7,900 79.00 
Czechoslovakia 12,800 128.00 
German Democratic Republic 15,500 155.00 
Hungary 7,900 79.00 
Poland 12,800 128.00 
Rumania 4,800 48.00 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 60,000 600.00 
Yugoslavia 12,800 128.00 
Australia 10,000 100.00 
Canada 34,000 340.00 
Egypt 1,000 10.00 
Japan 85,175 851.75 
Korea, Republic of 6,500 65.00 
Mexico 3,000 30.00 
Morocco 1,000 10.00 
New Zealand 1,000 10.00 
United States of America 100,000 1,000.00 
Non allocated shares 125 1.25 
Total 1,000,000 10,000.00 
 
Similar to the European Investment Bank, these capital subscription amounts 
were converted to the Euro in 1999.  Unlike the EIB, however, the EBRD 
does not focus primarily on the EU.  The subscribed members of the EBRD 
are worldwide, not just the European Union.  The variety of members of the 
EBRD indicates the focus of the EBRD is not centered in the European Union 
as the EIB proclaims to do with its mandate.   
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 The creation of the EBRD demonstrates the EU’s concerns for a 
development gap within the Europe; however its member base indicates a 
concern for areas outside the European Union.   Therefore, the task of aiding 
in regional development within the European Union falls on the EIB.  The 
EBRD just maintains a supporting role.    
Regional Development  
 
 The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development requires any 
country seeking investment from the bank to be moving toward a full market 
economy.  This requirement coincides with the mandate for requiring 
countries to be committed to democratic principles.  The creation of the 
Bank, although not limited to just European Union development, indicates 
the push for a market economy in the European region.  This effort is similar 
to that of the European Investment Bank.  The establishment of these two 
banks indicates the regional development gap occurring in Europe and the 
concern that Central and Eastern European nations will need to move 
towards a free market economy in order to be competitive with the world 
economic market today.  A brief analysis of the member subscription in each 
bank indicates the wider realm of the ERBD.  Membership in the ERBD 
includes the European Investment Bank, which indicates the overlapping 
direction of the Banks.  It could be perceived that the ERBD was created as a 
supplement to the EIB to decrease the increasing regional development gap.  
In addition, the inclusion of such nations as the United States indicates the 
worldwide concern for this increasing gap with the fall of communism in the 
east. 
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Chapter Four Case  
The Lending Patterns of The European Investment Bank 
 
Introduction 
 An overview of financing provided by the EIB since it’s inception in 
1959 through 1997 is indicated in Table 3.  This general overview indicates 
several points regarding EIB lending.  The Table indicates the general 
increase in financing throughout this time period.  This trend indicates the 
need for more lending as the European Union (or European Community, 
depending on the time) was growing.   It also indicates the gaining capital 
strength of the Bank since predominately most of the lending capital was 
from EIB’s own resources.  This Table also indicates financing that was 
provided in areas outside the European Union.  Although these data are not 
specific to lending location, it is an indication of EIB interest in outside areas.  
Unless this lending benefits a development within the Union, this type of 
lending is in direct contrast to the tasks of the EIB as set forth in the Protocol 
that calls for balanced development within the EU.  Although this financing 
only amounts to approximately nine percent of all financing within the period, 
it is still noteworthy in terms of the research. 
 Table 3: Financing Provided by the EIB from 1959-1997 
    ECU Million  
        
  Within the European Union Outside the European Union 
 Total Total Own 
Resources 
NCI* 
Resources 
Total Own 
Resources 
Budgetary 
Resources 
1959 34 34 34 - - - - 
1960 25 25 25 - - - - 
1961 87 87 87 - - - - 
1962 66 66 66 - - - - 
1963 71 56 56 - 15 15 - 
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1964 120 112 112 - 8 8 - 
1965 109 88 88 - 21 16 5 
1966 197 104 104 - 93 31 62 
1967 213 148 148 - 64 20 44 
1968 214 173 173 - 42 12 29 
1969 322 248 248 - 74 16 58 
1970 354 339 339 - 16 2 14 
1971 503 469 469 - 33 23 11 
1972 524 504 504 - 21 13 8 
1973 848 728 728 - 120 11 109 
1974 1,119 973 973 - 146 61 85 
1975 1,007 918 918 - 89 49 40 
1976 1,273 1,086 1,086 - 187 142 45 
1977 1,573 1,403 1,403 - 170 152 18 
1978 2,179 1,957 1,957 - 222 174 48 
1979 3,071 2,558 2,281 277 513 421 92 
1980 3,478 2,930 2,733 198 548 371 176 
1981 3,839 3,352 2,821 531 487 396 90 
1982 4,695 4,243 3,453 790 452 410 41 
1983 5,946 5,466 4,266 1,200 480 427 53 
1984 6,903 6,194 5,013 1,182 708 621 88 
1985 7,118 6,458 5,574 884 660 584 75 
1986 7,556 7,071 6,678 393 485 382 103 
1987 7,849 7,450 7,003 447 398 189 210 
1988 10,180 9,480 9,123 357 700 520 180 
1989 12,246 11,634 11,556 78 612 486 126 
1990 13,339 12,626 12,602 24 713 669 44 
1991 15,393 14,477 14,438 39 916 782 134 
1992 17,032 16,140 16,140 - 893 764 128 
1993 19,625 17,724 17,724 - 1,905 1,807 96 
1994 19,930 17,682 17,682 - 2,248 1,979 269 
1995 21,408 18,603 18,603 - 2,805 2,557 248 
1996 23,239 20,946 20,946 - 2,293 2,190 104 
1997 26,203 22,958 22,958 - 3,244 3,190 55 
        
 239,893 217,513 211,112 6,399 22,379 19,490 2,889 
  
 *New Community Instrument 
 
EIB Lending 1995-2001 
 The European Union created the European Investment Bank and the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development as a means of 
addressing the foreseen developmental gap that has been created by the 
induction of additional members to the European Union.  These banks were 
also created to assist the existing members in achieving a balanced economic 
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community.  A development gap clearly exists within the European Union; in 
order for the EU to successfully accept additional members it becomes 
necessary for this gap to be resolved.  A prevailing theme throughout the 
development of the EU and the EIB has been balanced development.  More 
detailed information regarding European Investment Bank financing is 
provided in tables 4, 5 and 6 documenting loans received by EU member 
countries for the period 1995-2001.  This more detailed data provides further 
proof of the ineffectiveness of the EIB in the area of regional development.  
Several points become apparent when reviewing the data from the 
tables.  A foremost objective of the European Investment Bank is balanced 
development; however upon examining the lending patterns indicated by the 
table in the period of 1995 – 2001 the percentage of loans appropriated for 
regional development peaks at 55 percent.   The loan emphasis during this 
period does not appear to be dominated by regional development 
investment.  To obtain the desired balanced economic arena, the economic 
development gap between the current member nations must be addressed 
and solved.  The members of the EU created the bank primarily for this 
purpose; however the data compiled uncovers the shortcomings of the EIB in 
this task.  To further bolster this finding, more in depth data are required. 
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Table 4: Total EIB Loans to EU Members 1995-2001 
 ECU Millions* 
EU 
Member
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Belgium 665.3 657 1,140 858 2260 503 365 
Denmark 824.9 688 737 745 898 991 1,172 
Germany 2715 3,022 3,518 5,168 5,534 6,038 6,017 
Greece 525.2 721 730 736 1,436 1,712 1,658 
Spain 2,817.6 2,553 2,716 3,152 4,048 4,199 4,559 
France 2,206.8 2,509 2,271 2,837 4,295 3,323 3,825 
Ireland 327.3 189 207 263 87 419 525 
Italy 3,434.9 4,121 3,517 4,387 4,053 5,640 5,488 
Luxembourg 78.8 - 96 109 105 200 10 
Austria 241.9 490 555 358 311 260 787 
Netherlands 318.9 766 398 426 606 735 820 
Portugal 1,231.5 1,294 1,350 1,505 1,603 1,852 1,799 
Finland 179.1 302 401 551 576 525 695 
Sweden 273.1 847 925 664 544 621 953 
United 
Kingdom 
2,243.9 2,386 3,765 3,074 3,348 3,303 2,337 
Totals 18,084.2 20,545 22,326 24,833 29,704 30,321 31,010 
 
*Years 2000 and 2001 are represented in Euro Millions pursuant to 1999 
Statute of the EIB change. 
 
 Table 5: Total EIB Regional Development Loans to EU Members  
  1995-2001 
 
ECU Millions* 
EU 
Member
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Belgium 138.1 197.3 351.7 876 - 178.1 0 
Denmark 294.3 385.3 24.8 459.9 540.5 338.1 280.8 
Germany 1,112.7 1,674.7 1,050.9 2,451.3 1,492.2 1,405.2 2,440.5 
Greece 269.4 656.7 730 37 1,369 1,702 1,608 
Spain 2,526.4 1,790.8 1,620.4 633 2,726.6 3,043 3,157 
France 972.9 1,124.5 777.4 776 850.6 506.6 951.2 
Ireland 133.4 189 71.9 112 - 317 425 
Italy 1,619.8 1,818.1 1,787.2 2,296.6 1,546.1 2,562.5 2,781.8 
Luxembourg 78.8 - - 0 - 200 10 
Austria 53.3 236.2 128.6 70 - 20 0 
Netherlands - - - 0 - 213 120 
Portugal 1,193.3 1,294 1,322 1,439 1,598 1,452 1,799 
Finland 14.2 - 213.3 285.3 411.7 370 78.6 
Sweden - 76.2 504.4 154.4 109.5 34.4 456 
United 
Kingdom 
1,571.6 1,044.2 2,395.9 1,068.4 2,206.1 1,395.9 605.3 
Totals 9,978.2 10,487 10,978.5 10,658.9 12,850.3 13,737.8 14,713.2 
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*Years 2000 and 2001 are represented in Euro Millions pursuant to 1999 
Statute of the EIB change. 
 
 Table 6: Percentage of Total EIB Loans Designated Regional  
  Development 1995-2001 
 
EU 
Member
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Belgium 21% 30% 31% 67% - 35% - 
Denmark 36% 56% 3% 62% 60% 34% 24% 
Germany 41% 54% 30% 47% 27% 23% 41% 
Greece 51% 91% 100% 51% 95% 99% 97% 
Spain 90% 70% 60% 20% 67% 72% 69% 
France 44% 45% 29% 27% 20% 15% 24% 
Ireland 41% 100% 35% 43% - 75% 81% 
Italy 47% 44% 51% 67% 38% 45% 51% 
Luxembourg 100% - - - - 100% 100% 
Austria 22% 48% 23% 20% - 7% - 
Netherlands - - - - - 28% 15% 
Portugal 97% 100% 98% 96% 100% 78% 100% 
Finland 8% - 53% 52% 71% 70% 11% 
Sweden - 9% 55% 23% 20% 5% 48% 
United 
Kingdom 
70% 44% 64% 35% 66% 42% 26% 
 
 Table 7: EU Member States’ Percentage of Total EIB Lending:  
  1995-2001 
 
EU 
Member
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Total**
Belgium 4% 3% 5% 4% 8% 2% 1% 4% 
Denmark 5% 3% 4% 3% 3% 3% 4% 3% 
Germany 15% 15% 16% 21% 19% 20% 19% 15% 
Greece 3% 4% 3% 3% 5% 6% 5% 8% 
Spain 16% 12% 12% 13% 14% 14% 15% 12% 
France 12% 12% 10% 11% 15% 11% 12% 12% 
Ireland 2% 1% 1% 1% - 1% 2% 3% 
Italy 19% 20% 16% 18% 14% 19% 18% 18% 
Luxembourg - - - - - 1% - - 
Austria 1% 2% 2% 1% 2% 2% 3% 2% 
Netherlands 2% 4% 2% 2% 1% 1% 3% 2% 
Portugal 7% 6% 6% 6% 5% 6% 6% 6% 
Finland 1% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 
Sweden 2% 4% 4% 3% 2% 2% 3% 3% 
United 
Kingdom 
12% 12% 17% 12% 11% 11% 8% 12% 
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 Table 8: EU Member States’ Percentage of Total EIB Regional  
  Development Lending:1995-2001 
 
EU 
Member
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Total**  
 
Belgium 1% 2% 3% 8% - 1% - 2% 
Denmark 3% 4% - 4% 4% 3% 2% 3% 
Germany 11% 16% 10% 23% 12% 10% 17% 14% 
Greece 3% 6% 7% - 11% 12% 11% 8% 
Spain 25% 17% 15% 6% 21% 22% 22% 18% 
France 10% 11% 7% 7% 7% 4% 7% 8% 
Ireland 1% 2% 1% 1% - 2% 3% 2% 
Italy 16% 17% 16% 22% 12% 19% 19% 17% 
Luxembourg 1% - - - - 2% - - 
Austria 1% 2% 1% 1% - 2% 1% 1% 
Netherlands - - - - - - - - 
Portugal 12% 12% 12% 14% 12% 11% 12% 12% 
Finland - - 2% 3% 3% 3% 1% 2% 
Sweden - - 5% 1% 1% - 3% 2% 
United 
Kingdom 
16% 10% 22% 10% 17% 10% 4% 12% 
 
*Percentages in tables 7 and 8 have been rounded to the nearest whole 
percentage 
 
**Total columns in tables 7 and 8 indicate total percentage during 1995-
2001 
 
 Examining these data discloses information regarding two member 
countries, Spain and the Netherlands. The EIB loans indicate that the 
Netherlands, during the time period studied received only 20 EUR in regional 
development loans that equates to less than 1 percent of the total EIB 
regional development loans received for all other member nations.  Spain, 
however, received 15,197.2 million EUR during this same time period that 
equates to 18 percent of all regional development loans issued by the EIB.  
Spain received the highest percentage of regional development loans during 
the research period.  The EIB regional development loans to Spain during 
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this period equal 72 percent of all EIB loans to Spain.  Italy, second to Spain, 
received 14,412.1 million EUR or 17 percent of regional development loans in 
the EU.  Germany received 11627.5 million EUR or 14 percent of all regional 
development lending.  Portugal and the United Kingdom both received 12 
percent of EIB regional development lending for the time period examined.  
Table 9 illustrates these member nations GDP during this time (Eurostat 
2003). 
 Table 9: GDP Per Capita in Purchasing Power Standards 
 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Netherlands 108.6 109 109.8 110.1 109.7 110.7 113.3 
Spain 79 79.5 79.7 81 83.5 83.4 84.3 
Italy 104.2 104 102.5 103.2 101.9 101.3 100.1 
Portugal 66 66.2 67.2 68.5 70.2 70.4 70.6 
Germany 107.8 107.1 105.1 103.9 103.1 102 100.5 
United 
Kingdom 
99.9 101.2 103.6 103.4 103 103.9 105.1 
 
Gross domestic product (GDP) is a measure of economic activity.  It is 
defined as the value of all goods and services produced less the value of any 
goods or services used in their creation (Eurostat 2003).  Purchasing Power 
Standards (PPS) is a common currency used in European Union country 
comparisons to eliminate the differences in price levels of individual member 
nations.1
 The GDP of Spain and the Netherlands illustrates the ineffectiveness of 
the European Investment Bank to address the regional development gap 
                                                 
1 Four of the six countries listed maintain the largest populations in the EU, 
with Germany ranking the largest, followed by the UK, Italy and Spain 
respectively.  Portugal has the lowest population in this data set, but still is 
the 9th highest in population.  Netherlands has the 6th largest population in 
EU. 
 40
existing within the European Union.  The gap that existed between the 
Netherlands and Spain in 1995 is still apparent in 2001.  These data indicate 
that the EIB efforts in Spain were futile in terms of promoting balanced 
development within the European Union.  The selection of these two 
countries for analysis was based on the financing received from the EIB.   
They represent the spectrum of economic development within the European 
Union; the two countries are on opposite ends of this spectrum.  The trend 
between Spain and Netherlands is indicative of the trends existing in terms of 
economic development within the European Union.  These data and findings 
represent the inability of the EIB to resolve the regional development gap as 
intended with its creation.  Based on these findings within the European 
Union, it can be concluded the European Investment Bank will also be 
impotent when additional countries seek admission to the Union.  The trends 
indicated in this time period do not indicate an effort on the part of the 
European Investment Bank to increase financing projects in the sphere of 
regional development.  The percentage of funding for regional development 
was at its highest (during the research period) in 1995 and declined from 
that point until 2000.  The percentage fell below 50 percent in 1997.  This 
does not indicate a solid effort by the EIB to address the regional 
development gap.  
 Italy and Germany illustrate another contradiction to the EIB goals.  
Italy’s and Germany’s GDPs are not as low as Spain; however, they still 
received a large portion of regional development lending.  The GDP did not 
improve over this time period, but declined in both countries instead. This 
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reveals two possible conclusions.  The EIB was not effective in triggering GDP 
growth in Italy and Germany or the GDP decline was lessened by EIB 
involvement.  The findings regarding Italy and Germany expose another 
possible research avenue regarding the European Investment Bank.  
Portugal’s and the UK’s GDPs did not decline during this period, but the gap 
between each of these member nations and the Netherlands did not seem to 
improve.  Portugal’s GDP is actually less than Spain’s but received less 
regional development lending and the lending it did receive did not improve 
the GDP during the research period.  The United Kingdom has a better GDP, 
but the regional development lending did not produce a significant 
improvement to the GDP.  The UK GDP is closer to that of the Netherlands, 
but 12 percent of all regional development lending was unable to close the 
gap between these two member nations.     
 The UK GDP is close to and in some years surpasses the average GDP 
for the European Union, yet still receives 12 percent of regional development 
lending for the research period.  Portugal received the same percentage of 
regional development lending however; Portugal’s GDP fell well below the EU 
average GDP.  The average GDP of the European Union during the research 
period is 100 PPS (Eurostat 2003).  Spain received the most regional 
development lending in this time period.  Spain’s GDP was below the 
average, but it was higher than that of Portugal.   Germany and Italy GDP 
were above the EU average, yet they both received relatively high 
percentages of regional development lending.  Political factors agreements 
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play a role in EIB lending.  Regional Development may be the foremost 
concern of the EIB but political factors weigh in lending decisions. 
 The research data indicates the development gap between the EU 
member nations in terms of GDP.  An examination of several of the nations 
during 1995-2001 illustrates the insignificance of the European Investment 
Bank to improve GDP and close this economic gap. 
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Chapter Five  
Conclusions 
 
 In the preceding chapters, I have presented a case study of the 
European Investment Banks lending between 1995 and 2001.  In Chapter 
two I described the origin and development of the European Investment 
Bank and its mission of balanced economic development from the Treaty of 
Rome in 1958 through the Treaty of Nice in 2003.  I also included in this 
chapter a summary and review of the main documents of the EU relating to 
the EIB. These documents provided a foundation for the case study and the 
framework on which to test, in Chapter four, the proposition established in 
Chapter one.  Chapter three provided a general overview of the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development.  This summary confirmed the 
member states’ concern for regional development and the additional 
institutions they created in 1991 to combat the development gap problem.  
In chapter four, I offered evidence to test the proposition that the member 
states have not been successful in closing differences in levels of 
development among themselves.  An examination of lending patterns with 
the European Union by the EIB particularly in tables 7, 8 and 9 demonstrated 
where EIB funding has been directed and how it benefited the member state.   
 The analysis offered in the preceding chapters suggests that the 
European Investment Bank investment practices have not been effective in 
fulfilling its mission of balanced development among the member states of 
the European Union.  First, as indicated in Table 8, EIB regional development 
lending between 1995 and 2001 was distributed in a bimodal manner. Within 
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this distribution, some member states, such as Greece and Ireland, received 
far less than more developed member states (i.e., United Kingdom and 
Italy). Second, during the same period, EIB lending did not correspond with a 
reduction in the develop gap among all the member states. While the relative 
distribution of GDP per capita purchasing power among the five member 
states who received the largest portion of EIB lending did change in some 
cases (e.g., between Spain and Italy), the overall gap continues to be 
significant among even the largest recipients of EIB lending (Table 9). An 
examination of the GDP of the member states was used as one economic 
measure of the effectiveness of EIB lending.  Examining the lending of the 
EIB to the member nations of the European Union demonstrates that the 
regional development gap continues to be a problem.  
The concept of a balanced economic community envisioned with the 
Treaty of Rome in 1957 has yet to come to realization.  The European 
Investment, by its own Protocol, was developed to promote balanced 
economic growth.  This cannot be attained without addressing the regional 
development gap between the existing member countries.  The creation of 
the EIB and The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development indicate 
the concern of the European Union for balanced economic development. 
 Additional findings from this research illustrate that the bank has not 
been able to fulfill its mission. Lending data of the Bank indicates several 
factors regarding the Bank’s efforts.  The Bank’s own Protocol defines its task 
as contributing to a balanced development of the common market for the 
interest of the entire community.  The data suggest that the Bank’s 
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contributions, loans, have not significantly improved economic development 
as defined by Gross Domestic Product (GDP).  Consequently, the European 
Union can not rely only on the EIB to institute balanced regional development 
either for its current members or for the new members that will be added in 
May 2004. Since the Bank has not been able to significantly reduce the gap 
among the current member states, the addition of more members will make 
its mission even more difficult to fulfill.  
 The historical overview of the development of the European Union 
from the Common Market stage through the current European Union 
illustrates the political undertones of enlargement and the continued problem 
of balanced development.  The goal of the EU is integration on several levels, 
including economy.  The Common Market was the beginning process of 
economic integration.  The political influences are prevalent throughout this 
process.  The enlargement stages appear to be concerned with integration, 
but candidate countries and member nation may have separate agendas that 
are more nationalistic than supranational.  These enlargement stages 
illustrate the development gaps that were present during the Common 
Market stage and continued throughout each enlargement.  The 
interdependence of European economies was prevalent prior to integration 
and sometimes resulted in application for entry into the EU, as with Ireland.  
The weak economy of Ireland exemplifies the development gap existing in 
the European Union.  The rhetoric of balanced development of the European 
Union is overshadowed by political motivations for enlargement in many 
cases.   The concern in expanding a free market economy, particularly in 
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candidate countries from Eastern Europe is greater than an ensuing regional 
development gap that is continuing to grow.   
 The continued growth of the EU is not taken into consideration in the 
EIB’s capital base.  Since its inception the average amount of subscribed 
capital paid has only increased 1.5 percent.  The average amount of paid 
subscribed capital was increased in 1999 with the Statute of the European 
Investment Bank.  The addition of 10 members to the EU will apply additional 
pressure to the existing insufficient subscribed capital under these 
circumstances. 
 The review of the Protocol of The European Investment Bank and other 
documents of the European Union indicate the Union’s concern for balanced 
regional development and the desire for a balanced economic environment.  
The EIB’s mandate has not significantly altered since its inception in 1957 
with the Treaty of Rome.  Other literature on the European Investment Bank 
touches on other areas of the bank, including sustainable development, but 
leaves a void in the area of economic analysis and significance of the EIB.  
This research fills this space with reliable data to evaluate the effectiveness 
of the EIB in promoting regional economic balance.  The lending patterns 
researched do not hold much promise for the EIB, on its own, to solve the 
regional development gap.  
 Future research will need to identify other factors present in the world 
economic environment that may be hindering balanced development within 
the European Union.  Further research should also consider the other 
programs the EIB supports and how these lending programs may be affecting 
 47
the regional development gap.  The research has indicated that at best 
during the research period only 55 percent of total EIB loans were directed to 
addressing the regional development problem.  The European Investment 
Bank, although created to aid in the balanced development, has been shown 
to be less successful than its mission indicates in its efforts to stimulate 
economic growth and thereby reduce regional economic differences among 
the current members of the EU.  New members of the Union would increase 
this burden and possibly render the EIB even less effective in assisting in this 
endeavor. Finally, future research should be undertaken to address the 
political factors that effect economic development gaps among the member 
states.  In the introductory chapter, I described the various initiatives that 
led to the enlargement of the Common Market members from six in 1958 to 
the current fifteen members of the European Union.  Each enlargement was 
preceded by considerable political negotiations. While the EIB had to address 
the consequences of these decisions, its capacity to effectively do so to close 
the development gap was reduced because its resources did not increase 
accordingly.  Hence, future research should take into consideration the 
extent to which the persistence of the development gap among the member 
states is also a result of decisions outside the control of either the EIB or 
market forces. 
 
 48
References 
 
 
 Balchin, P. & Sykora, L. (1999). Regional Policy and Planning in 
Europe. New York: Routledge. 
 
 Coombes, D. & Rees, N. (1991). Regional and Social Policy. In L. 
Hurwitz & C. Lequesne (Eds.)  The State of The European Community: 
Polices, Institutions, and Debates in the Transition Years (pp. 207-228). 
Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
 
 Dinan, D. (Ed.) (1998). Encyclopedia of the European Union. Boulder, 
CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
 
 Dinan, D. (1999). Ever Closer Union.  Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers. 
 
 Dougherty, J.E. & Pfalzgraff, R.L. (1990). Contending Theories of 
International Relations (3rd ed.) New York: Harper & Row. 
 
 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (1991).  Basic 
Documents [WWW document].  URL htt://www.erbd.com 
 
 European Investment Bank (1996).  Annual Report.  Luxembourg: 
European Investment Bank. 
 
European Investment Bank (1997).  Annual Report.  Luxembourg: 
European Investment Bank 
 
European Investment Bank (1998).  Annual Report.  Luxembourg: 
European Investment Bank 
 
European Investment Bank (1999).  Annual Report.  Luxembourg: 
European Investment Bank 
 
European Investment Bank (2000).  Annual Report.  Luxembourg: 
European Investment Bank 
 
 European Investment Bank (1978).  European Investment Bank: 20 
years, 1958-1978. Luxembourg: European Investment Bank. 
 
 European Investment Bank (2000).  EIB Lending in 2000 [WWW 
document]. URL http://www.eib.org
 
 European Investment Bank (2001).  EIB Lending in 2001 [WWW 
document]. URL http://www.eib.org
 
 49
 European Investment Bank (1999). Welcome to the European Investment 
Bank [WWW document]. URL http://www.eib.org
 
 Eurostat (2003) GDP per capita in PPS [WWW document].  URL 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat 
 
 Handl, G. (1998) The Legal Mandate of Multilateral Development 
Banks as Agents for Change Toward Sustainable Development.  American 
Journal of International Law,92, 642-665. 
 
 Laffan, B. (1997).  The Finances of the European Union.  New York: St. 
Martin’s Press. 
 
 Osborne, A. (1998) EIB Takes On New Role. Europe, 377, 37. 
 
 Zysman, J. & Schwartz, A. (1998) Reunifying Europe in an Emerging 
World Economy:  Economic Heterogeneity, New Industrial Options, and 
Political Choices.  Journal of Common Market Studies, 36, 405 – 429.
 50
Appendix
 51
Appendix A:  Protocol Establishing the European Investment Bank 
 
 
Article 1: The EIB is established by Article 266 of the Treaty and shall 
function in accordance with that article and the provisions of the following 
protocol.  The seat of the Bank will be determined by common accord of the 
governments of the member states. 
 
Article 2:  The task of the bank is defined in Article 267 of the Treaty. 
 
Article 3:  The members of the EIB shall be the following: 
  
 The Kingdom of Belgium 
 The Kingdom of Denmark 
 The Federal Republic of Germany 
 The Hellenic Republic 
 The Kingdom of Spain 
 The French Republic 
 Ireland 
 The Italian Republic 
 The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg 
 The Kingdom of the Netherlands 
 The Republic of Austria 
 The Portuguese Republic 
 The Republic of Finland 
 The Kingdom of Sweden 
 The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
 
Article 4:  Designates the unit of account for the European Investment Bank 
shall be ECU as used by the European Community. The Board of Governors 
acting unanimously on a proposal from the Board of Directors may alter this 
definition.  The capital of the bank shall be ECU 62 013 million as subscribed 
by the member states as follows:
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 Table 10: Subscribed Capital of the European Investment  
    Bank  
 
Germany 11,017,450,00 
France 11,017,450,00 
Italy 11,017,450,00 
United Kingdom 11,017,450,00 
Spain 4,049,856,000 
Belgium 3,053,960,000 
Netherlands 3,053,960,000 
Sweden 2,026,000,000 
Denmark 1,546,308,000 
Austria 1,516,000,000 
Finland 871,000,000 
Greece 828,380,000 
Portugal 533,844,000 
Ireland 386,576,000 
Luxembourg 77,316,000 
 
Member states are only liable to the amount of their share of the capital 
subscribed and not paid up.  An addition of a new member will result in an 
increase of the subscribed capital corresponding to the capital brought by the 
new member.  Board of Governors of the EIB may decide, unanimously, to 
increase the subscribed capital.  A member’s share in the subscribed capital 
may not be transferred, pledged or attached. 
 
Article 5:  Subscribed capital shall be paid in by the member state to the 
extent of 7.50162895 percent on the average of the amounts defined in 
Article 4.  In the event of an increase in subscribed capital, the Board of 
Governors may unanimously fix the percentage to be paid up and make 
arrangements for payments.  The Board of Directors may require payment of 
the balance of subscribed capital in the event the Bank has to meet 
obligations to those who have made loans to the Bank.  Each Member state 
would make payment in proportion to its share of the subscribed capital in 
the currency required by the Bank in order to meet its obligations. 
 
Article 6:  In the event the bank is unable to obtain the necessary funds on 
the capital markets for a specific project, The Board of Governors, acting on 
a proposal from the Board of Directors may decide that member nations 
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grant special interest loans to the bank.  These special loans may not be 
called for until the beginning of the fourth year after entry into force of this 
treaty.  These loans may not exceed 400 million unit of account in aggregate 
or 100 million units of account per annum.  The terms of special loans will be 
related to the term of the loan or guarantee the Bank proposes to grant, but 
will not exceed 20 years.  The Board of Governors, acting on a proposal from 
the Board of Directors may decide on prior repayment of special loans.   
 
These special loans will bear an interest rate of 4 percent per annum, unless 
otherwise specified by the Board of Governors.  The Member States will grant 
special loans in proportion to their shares in the subscribed capital of the 
Bank.  The payment will be made in the national currency and due within 6 
months of being called for.  In the event the Bank would go into liquidation, 
these special loans will only be repaid to the Member Nations after all other 
debts of the Bank are settled. 
 
Article 7:  In the event a Member State’s currency value in relation to the 
unit of account defined in Article 4 is reduced, that State will adjust the 
amount of the subscribed capital share in proportion to the change in value 
by making a supplementary payment to the Bank.  Likewise, if the value of 
the currency increases, the Bank will make repayment to the State in 
proportion to this change. 
 
Market rates determine the rate for converting Member State’s currency to 
the unit of account and vice versa.  The Board of Governors acting on a 
proposal from the Board of Directors may alter this conversion method. 
 
Article 8:  The Bank will be comprised of a Board of Governors, a Board of 
Directors and a Management Committee. 
 
Article 9:  The Board of Governors consists of ministers appointed by the 
Member States and has the following duties: 
 
1. Defines and insures implementation of the credit policy of the Bank. 
This policy should reference the objectives to be attained as 
progressing toward a common market. 
2. Decides on whether to increase the subscribed capital (Article 4). 
3. Decides on issues involving special loans (Article 6). 
4. Authorizes investment loans outside the Member States (Article 18). 
5. Appoints the Board of Directors and Management Committee, decides 
on compulsory retirement of those members and the duties of those 
members. 
6. Has the authority to vary the number of members on the Management 
Committee 
7. Approves the annual report of the Board of Directors. 
8. Approves the profit and loss account and the balance sheet. 
9. Approves the Rules of Procedure of the Bank. 
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10. Defines the unit of account of the subscribed capital. 
11. May alter the method of converting from national currencies to the 
unit of account and vice versa. 
12.Has the authority to suspend loans or guarantees to a Member States 
if that Member State has failed to meet its obligations of membership 
in the Bank. 
13.Has the authority to decide to suspend the operations of the Bank. 
14.In the event of liquidation, has the authority to appoint liquidators and 
oversee liquidation. 
 
Article 10: Unless otherwise specifically stated in the Bank’s Statute, 
decisions by the Board of Governors require a majority of its members.  The 
majority must represent at least 50 percent of the subscribed capital. 
 
Article 11:  Describes the duties and make up of the Board of Directors.  The 
Board of Directors has sole power to make decisions regarding loans and 
guarantees and raising loans.  Is has the authority to fix interest on loans 
granted and commission on guarantees.  The Board of Directors is 
responsible for insuring the Bank is properly run and managed in accordance 
with the provisions of this Treaty and Statute and implementation of 
directives issued by the Board of Governors. The Board of Directors will also 
submit a report to the Board of Directors at the end of each financial year 
and publish it when the Board of Directors approves it.  The Board of 
Directors consists of 25 Directors and 13 Alternatives and is appointed and 
can be renewed by the Board of Governors for a term of 5 years as follows: 
 
• Three directors nominated by the Federal Republic of Germany 
• Three directors nominated by the French Republic 
• Three directors nominated by the Italian Republic 
• Three directors nominated by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland 
• Two directors nominated by the Kingdom of Spain 
• One director nominated by the Kingdom of Belgium 
• One director nominated by the Kingdom of Denmark 
• One director nominated by the Hellenic Republic 
• One director nominated by Ireland 
• One director nominated by the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg 
• One director nominated by the Kingdom of the Netherlands 
• One director nominated by the Republic of Austria 
• One director nominated by the Portuguese Republic 
• One director nominated by the Republic of Finland 
• One director nominated by the Kingdom of Sweden 
• One director nominated by the Commission 
 
Alternatives will also be appointed and can be renewed by the Board of 
Governors for a term of 5 years as follows: 
 
• Two alternatives nominated by the Federal Republic of Germany 
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• Two alternatives nominated by the French Republic 
• Two alternatives nominated by the Italian Republic 
• Two alternatives nominated by the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland 
• One alternative nominated by mutual agreement between the 
Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic 
• One alternative nominated by the mutual agreement of the Benelux 
countries 
• One alternative nominated by the mutual agreement between the 
Kingdom of Denmark, the Hellenic Republic and Ireland 
• One alternative nominated by the mutual agreement between the 
Republic of Austria, the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom of 
Sweden 
• One alternative nominated by the Commission 
 
Alternatives may take part in Board of Directors meetings, but have no right 
of vote unless they have replaced an appointed director.  The President of 
the Management Committee or one of the Vice Presidents will preside over 
the Board of Directors meetings, but will not have a vote.  Directors and 
alternatives are responsible only to the Bank. 
 
Any Director may be forced into retirement if he no longer fulfils the 
conditions required by a qualified majority of the Board of Directors.  Any 
vacancy arising on the board would result in a replacement for the remainder 
of term unless the entire Board of Directors is being replaced. 
 
The Board of Governors determines the number of members on the Board of 
Directors and also acting unanimously determines what activities are 
considered incompatible with the duties of a director or alternate. 
 
 
Article 12:  Each director on the Board of Directors is entitled to one vote and 
can delegate this vote in all cases.  Unless otherwise specified the decisions 
of the Board of Directors require a simple majority of members entitled to 
vote.  A qualified majority (at this time) requires 17 votes in favor.  The 
Rules of Procedure of the European Investment Bank determines the quorum 
required for the adoption of decisions. 
 
Article 13:  The Management Committee consists of a President and six Vice-
Presidents appointed by the Board of Governors for a renewable term of 6 
years.    The Board of Directors, acting unanimously, may also alter the 
number of members on the management committee.  A qualified majority of 
the Board of Governors acting on a qualified proposal of the Board of 
Directors may compulsorily retire a member of the Committee. 
The responsibilities and duties of the Management Committee include 
preparing decisions of the Board of Directors regarding the granting of loans 
and guarantees, insuring these decisions are implemented.  The Committee 
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is responsible for the current business of the bank under the authority of the 
President and the supervision of the Board of Directors.  The Management  
Committee will deliver opinions or proposals about loans and guarantees and 
will do so by a majority of the Committee. 
 
All staff and officials of the European Investment Bank will work under the 
authority of the President of the Management Committee.    Hiring and firing 
of staff will be the responsibility of the President and this staff will be of 
equitable representation of the Member States. The President or Vice 
President in the event the President is unable, represents the Bank in 
judicial, as well as other matters. The Management Committee and staff are 
only responsible to the Bank and are completely independent. 
 
Article 14:  The Board of Governors will appoint a committee of three 
members to annually verify the operations of the Bank.  The verification of 
the books will include confirmation of the balance sheet and profit/loss 
statements reflect the position of the Bank. 
 
Article 15: The Bank will conduct its business through the authority 
designated by the State and will have recourse to the bank of issue of the 
Member State concerned or another financial institution approved by the 
State. 
 
Article 16: The Bank will cooperate with all international organizations similar 
to themselves and will establish contacts, in the interest of cooperation, with 
other banking and financial institutions in the countries where Bank 
operations extend. 
 
Article 17:  The Board of Governors, at the request of a Member State or The 
Commission or its own initiative, will implement the directives set forth in 
Article 9 of this Statute. 
 
Article 18: The Bank will grant loans to its members or to private or public 
undertakings for investment with the European territories of the Member 
States, in the event funds are not available from other sources and with 
reasonable terms.  The Bank may grant loans for investment outside the 
European territories when authorized by the Board of Governors acting on a 
proposal from the Board of Directors.   
 
Loans or grants to a body other than a Member State, the loan or grant 
should be guaranteed by the Member State where the project is being carried 
out or other adequate guarantees.  The Bank may also guarantee loans 
contracted by public or private entities as provided for in the Treaty. 
The total amount of loans and guarantees at any time will not exceed 250 
percent of the subscribed capital of the Bank.  The Bank has the authority to 
protect itself against risk by placing clauses in the loans and guarantees, as it 
considers appropriate. 
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Article 19:  Interest rates on loans and guarantees shall be determined by 
the capital market and calculated to allow the Bank to meet its obligations 
and cover its operating expenses.  The Bank cannot reduce interest rates.  
The Member State or another agency concerned may grant aid towards the 
payment of interest. 
 
Article 20:  The Bank shall adhere to the following operating principles in 
regard to loans and guarantees: 
 
• Ensure that funds are used rationally in the interest of the European 
Community. 
• The Bank may only grant loans or guarantees where the project 
increases economic production and promotes the goal of the common 
market.  Loans and grants in the production sector can be covered by 
the operating profits of the Bank or by a commitment by the State 
where the project is carried out. 
• The Bank will not gain any interest in or assume any management 
responsibility of a project unless it is required to ensure repayment of 
funds to the Bank. 
• The Bank can dispose of its claims on the capital market and require 
its debtors to issue bonds or other forms of security. 
• The Bank or a Member State cannot require that funds lent by the 
Bank be used in a specific Member State. 
• Loans can be conditional on international tender being arranged. 
• The Bank may not under any circumstances finance a project to be 
carried out in a Member State where the project is opposed by that 
Member State. 
 
Article 21:  Procedures regarding attainment of loans and guarantees: 
 
• Applications can be make to the Bank through the Commission or 
Member State where the project will be carried out. 
• Applications made through the Commission will be submitted to the 
involved Member State for opinion: applications made through a 
Member State will be submitted to the Commission for an opinion. 
• These opinions must be submitted within 2 months of the application, 
no response will indicate to the Bank that there is no objection to the 
project. 
• Applications submitted by the Management Committee will be ruled on 
by the Board of Directors. 
• The Management Committee decides whether submitted applications 
comply with the Statute of the Bank.  If in favor of granting the loan or 
guarantee, the Management Committee, will submit a draft contract to 
the Board of Directors.  If the Management Committee is against an 
application for loan or guarantee, it will also submit this opinion to the 
Board of Directors 
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• The Board of Directors cannot grant the loan or guarantee if the 
opinion of the Management Committee is unfavorable, unless it is a 
unanimous decision by the Board of Directors. 
• This policy is the same for The Commission when delivering an 
unfavorable opinion, except when the Board of Directors votes on the 
loan application, the Director nominated by the Commission must 
abstain from the vote. 
• In the event both The Commission and The Management Committee 
deliver unfavorable opinions about the proposed loan or guarantee, the 
Board of Directors may not grant the loan or guarantee. 
 
 
Article 22:  The Bank generates the funds necessary for its purposes by 
borrowing on the international capital markets.  This includes borrowing on 
the capital market of any Member State.  If the Member State does not have 
any legal provisions for this, the Member State and the Bank may reach an 
agreement about the individual loan.  The Member State has the right to 
refuse to agree to the loan in the event it would cause a disturbance in the 
capital market of that Member State. 
 
Article 23:  The Bank generates funds to meet its obligations by the 
following: 
 
• Investing in money markets 
• Buying and selling securities issued by the Bank or by those who have 
borrowed from it 
• Any financial operation linked to its objectives 
 
The Bank cannot engage in currency arbitrage unless it is required to fulfill its 
obligations.  The Bank will act in agreement with the bank or authorities of 
the concerned Member State. 
 
Article 24:  A reserve fund of 10 percent of the subscribed capital will be 
progressively amassed.  The Board of Directors has the authority to grant 
additional reserves if the liabilities of the Bank justify additional reserves.  
The fund is developed from the interest received from loans granted by the 
Bank.  This reserve fund is separate from the income required to meet the 
Bank’s obligations.  The reserve fund will be invested in manner that allows 
quick availability (liquidity). 
 
Article 25:  The Bank can transfer its assets into the currency from one 
Member State to another Member State to perform its operations.  These 
transfers should be avoided if the Bank already has cash or liquid assets in 
the currency required.  The Bank cannot transfer its assets in the currency of 
a Member State to that of a third country without the Member State’s 
agreement.  The Bank is free to dispose of any of its capital, which is paid up  
in convertible currency, and any currency borrowed on markets outside the 
Community.    Members States are required to make currency available to 
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the debtors of the Bank, so that they may repay interest and commissions on 
loans to the Bank. 
 
Article 26: A qualified majority of the Board of Governors may suspend 
service to a Member state if that State fails to meet its obligations to the 
Bank.  These obligations include paying its share of the subscribed capital, 
granting special loans or servicing its borrowers.  This suspension does not 
release the Member State from its obligations to the Bank. 
 
Article 27:  The Board of Governors, in the event of liquidation, will appoint 
the liquidators and instruct them on carrying out the liquidation.  In the 
event of liquidation, the Bank operations will cease, except for those 
processes, which are necessary to preserve its assets and to settle its 
liabilities. 
 
Article 28:  The property of the Bank is exempt from any expropriation.    
The Bank will assume the most legal capacities under the law in each of the 
Member State, particularly those laws referring to acquiring and disposing of 
property. 
 
Article 29:  Disputes between the Bank and its creditors, debtors and others 
will be decided by the national courts, except where the jurisdiction lies with 
the Court of Justice.  The Bank will have an address for its service in each 
Member State.  Any property of the Bank is not liable to attachment or 
seizure except by a decision of a court. 
 
Article 30:  The Board of Governors acting unanimously can establish a 
European Investment Fund of which the Bank would be a founding member.  
The Board of Governors would also establish the Statute of The European 
Investment Fund, which would define the objectives, structure, membership, 
financial resources, auditing of the Fund, as well as the relationship between 
the Bank and the Fund.   
 
The Bank would participate in the management of the Fund and contribute to 
its subscribed capital.  The European Community may also become members 
of the Fund and contribute to its subscribed capital.  The invitation to become 
a member is also open to financial institutions. 
 
The protocol regarding privileges of the European Community would apply to 
the Fund and its members.    The Fund is not subject to any form of taxation 
either when in operation or in the event of liquidation or dissolution.  Any 
dividends, revenue or capital gains to members of the Fund, other than the 
Community and the Bank, will remain subject to applicable legislation.  The 
Court of Justice will maintain jurisdiction over disputes within the Fund. 
 
This protocol essentially establishes the European Bank and these 
principles are relatively unchanged, as is the structure the Bank.  Review of 
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additional European Union documents will illustrate the minor changes that 
have been instituted with the Bank. 
 
A decision of the representatives of The Governments of the Member 
States on the provisional location of certain institutions and departments of 
the Communities was signed in April 1965 and establishes the location of the 
EIB.  The European Investment Bank will be located in Luxembourg and all 
meetings of the Bank will occur there.  All activities of the Bank will be 
carried out from this location. 
 
Member states are only liable to the amount of their share of the capital 
subscribed and not paid up.  An addition of a new member will result in an 
increase of the subscribed capital corresponding to the capital brought by the 
new member.  Board of Governors of the EIB may decide, unanimously, to 
increase the subscribed capital.  A member’s share in the subscribed capital 
may not be transferred, pledged or attached. 
 
Article 5:  Subscribed capital shall be paid in by the member state to the 
extent of 7.50162895 percent on the average of the amounts defined in 
Article 4.  In the event of an increase in subscribed capital, the Board of 
Governors may unanimously fix the percentage to be paid up and make 
arrangements for payments.  The Board of Directors may require payment of 
the balance of subscribed capital in the event the Bank has to meet 
obligations to those who have made loans to the Bank.  Each Member state 
would make payment in proportion to its share of the subscribed capital in 
the currency required by the Bank in order to meet its obligations. 
 
Article 6:  In the event the bank is unable to obtain the necessary funds on 
the capital markets for a specific project, The Board of Governors, acting on 
a proposal from the Board of Directors may decide that member nations 
grant special interest loans to the bank.  These special loans may not be 
called for until the beginning of the fourth year after entry into force of this 
treaty.  These loans may not exceed 400 million unit of account in aggregate 
or 100 million units of account per annum.  The terms of special loans will be 
related to the term of the loan or guarantee the Bank proposes to grant, but 
will not exceed 20 years.  The Board of Governors, acting on a proposal from 
the Board of Directors may decide on prior repayment of special loans.   
These special loans will bear an interest rate of 4 percent per annum, unless 
otherwise specified by the Board of Governors.  The Member States will grant 
special loans in proportion to their shares in the subscribed capital of the 
Bank.  The payment will be made in the national currency and due within 6 
months of being called for.  In the event the Bank would go into liquidation, 
these special loans will only be repaid to the Member Nations after all other 
debts of the Bank are settled. 
 
Article 7:  In the event a Member State’s currency value in relation to the 
unit of account defined in Article 4 is reduced, that State will adjust the 
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amount of the subscribed capital share in proportion to the change in value 
by making a supplementary payment to the Bank.  Likewise, if the value of 
the currency increases, the Bank will make repayment to the State in 
proportion to this change. 
 
Market rates determine the rate for converting Member State’s currency to 
the unit of account and vice versa.  The Board of Governors acting on a 
proposal from the Board of Directors may alter this conversion method. 
 
Article 8:  The Bank will be comprised of a Board of Governors, a Board of 
Directors and a Management Committee. 
 
Article 9:  The Board of Governors consists of ministers appointed by the 
Member States and has the following duties: 
 
15.Defines and insures implementation of the credit policy of the Bank. 
This policy should reference the objectives to be attained as 
progressing toward a common market. 
16.Decides on whether to increase the subscribed capital (Article 4). 
17.Decides on issues involving special loans (Article 6). 
18.Authorizes investment loans outside the Member States (Article 18). 
19.Appoints the Board of Directors and Management Committee, decides 
on compulsory retirement of those members and the duties of those 
members. 
20.Has the authority to vary the number of members on the Management 
Committee 
21.Approves the annual report of the Board of Directors. 
22.Approves the profit and loss account and the balance sheet. 
23.Approves the Rules of Procedure of the Bank. 
24. Defines the unit of account of the subscribed capital. 
25. May alter the method of converting from national currencies to the 
unit of account and vice versa. 
26.Has the authority to suspend loans or guarantees to a Member States 
if that Member State has failed to meet its obligations of membership 
in the Bank. 
27.Has the authority to decide to suspend the operations of the Bank. 
 
28.In the event of liquidation, has the authority to appoint liquidators and 
oversee liquidation. 
 
Article 10: Unless otherwise specifically stated in the Bank’s Statute, 
decisions by the Board of Governors require a majority of its members.  The 
majority must represent at least 50 percent of the subscribed capital. 
 
Article 11:  Describes the duties and make up of the Board of Directors.  The 
Board of Directors has sole power to make decisions regarding loans and 
guarantees and raising loans.  Is has the authority to fix interest on loans 
granted and commission on guarantees.  The Board of Directors is 
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responsible for insuring the Bank is properly run and managed in accordance 
with the provisions of this Treaty and Statute and implementation of 
directives issued by the Board of Governors. The Board of Directors will also 
submit a report to the Board of Directors at the end of each financial year 
and publish it when the Board of Directors approves it.  The Board of 
Directors consists of 25 Directors and 13 Alternatives and is appointed and 
can be renewed by the Board of Governors for a term of 5 years as follows: 
 
• Three directors nominated by the Federal Republic of Germany 
• Three directors nominated by the French Republic 
• Three directors nominated by the Italian Republic 
• Three directors nominated by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland 
• Two directors nominated by the Kingdom of Spain 
• One director nominated by the Kingdom of Belgium 
• One director nominated by the Kingdom of Denmark 
• One director nominated by the Hellenic Republic 
• One director nominated by Ireland 
• One director nominated by the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg 
• One director nominated by the Kingdom of the Netherlands 
• One director nominated by the Republic of Austria 
• One director nominated by the Portuguese Republic 
• One director nominated by the Republic of Finland 
• One director nominated by the Kingdom of Sweden 
• One director nominated by the Commission 
 
Alternatives will also be appointed and can be renewed by the Board of 
Governors for a term of 5 years as follows: 
 
• Two alternatives nominated by the Federal Republic of Germany 
• Two alternatives nominated by the French Republic 
• Two alternatives nominated by the Italian Republic 
• Two alternatives nominated by the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland 
• One alternative nominated by mutual agreement between the 
Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic 
• One alternative nominated by the mutual agreement of the Benelux 
countries 
• One alternative nominated by the mutual agreement between the 
Kingdom of Denmark, the Hellenic Republic and Ireland 
• One alternative nominated by the mutual agreement between the 
Republic of Austria, the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom of 
Sweden 
• One alternative nominated by the Commission 
 
Alternatives may take part in Board of Directors meetings, but have no right 
of vote unless they have replaced an appointed director.  The President of 
the Management Committee or one of the Vice Presidents will preside over 
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the Board of Directors meetings, but will not have a vote.  Directors and 
alternatives are responsible only to the Bank. 
 
Any Director may be forced into retirement if he no longer fulfils the 
conditions required by a qualified majority of the Board of Directors.  Any 
vacancy arising on the board would result in a replacement for the remainder 
of term unless the entire Board of Directors is being replaced. 
 
The Board of Governors determines the number of members on the Board of 
Directors and also acting unanimously determines what activities are 
considered incompatible with the duties of a director or alternate. 
 
 
Article 12:  Each director on the Board of Directors is entitled to one vote and 
can delegate this vote in all cases.  Unless otherwise specified the decisions 
of the Board of Directors require a simple majority of members entitled to 
vote.  A qualified majority (at this time) requires 17 votes in favor.  The 
Rules of Procedure of the European Investment Bank determines the quorum 
required for the adoption of decisions. 
 
Article 13:  The Management Committee consists of a President and six Vice-
Presidents appointed by the Board of Governors for a renewable term of 6 
years.    The Board of Directors, acting unanimously, may also alter the 
number of members on the management committee.  A qualified majority of 
the Board of Governors acting on a qualified proposal of the Board of 
Directors may compulsorily retire a member of the Committee. 
The responsibilities and duties of the Management Committee include 
preparing decisions of the Board of Directors regarding the granting of loans 
and guarantees, insuring these decisions are implemented.  The Committee 
is responsible for the current business of the bank under the authority of the 
President and the supervision of the Board of Directors.  The Management  
Committee will deliver opinions or proposals about loans and guarantees and 
will do so by a majority of the Committee. 
 
All staff and officials of the European Investment Bank will work under the 
authority of the President of the Management Committee.    Hiring and firing 
of staff will be the responsibility of the President and this staff will be of 
equitable representation of the Member States. The President or Vice 
President in the event the President is unable, represents the Bank in 
judicial, as well as other matters. The Management Committee and staff are 
only responsible to the Bank and are completely independent. 
 
Article 14:  The Board of Governors will appoint a committee of three 
members to annually verify the operations of the Bank.  The verification of 
the books will include confirmation of the balance sheet and profit/loss 
statements reflect the position of the Bank. 
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Article 15: The Bank will conduct its business through the authority 
designated by the State and will have recourse to the bank of issue of the 
Member State concerned or another financial institution approved by the 
State. 
 
Article 16: The Bank will cooperate with all international organizations similar 
to themselves and will establish contacts, in the interest of cooperation, with 
other banking and financial institutions in the countries where Bank 
operations extend. 
 
Article 17:  The Board of Governors, at the request of a Member State or The 
Commission or its own initiative, will implement the directives set forth in 
Article 9 of this Statute. 
 
Article 18: The Bank will grant loans to its members or to private or public 
undertakings for investment with the European territories of the Member 
States, in the event funds are not available from other sources and with 
reasonable terms.  The Bank may grant loans for investment outside the 
European territories when authorized by the Board of Governors acting on a 
proposal from the Board of Directors.   
 
Loans or grants to a body other than a Member State, the loan or grant 
should be guaranteed by the Member State where the project is being carried 
out or other adequate guarantees.  The Bank may also guarantee loans 
contracted by public or private entities as provided for in the Treaty. 
The total amount of loans and guarantees at any time will not exceed 250 
percent of the subscribed capital of the Bank.  The Bank has the authority to 
protect itself against risk by placing clauses in the loans and guarantees, as it 
considers appropriate. 
 
Article 19:  Interest rates on loans and guarantees shall be determined by 
the capital market and calculated to allow the Bank to meet its obligations 
and cover its operating expenses.  The Bank cannot reduce interest rates.  
The Member State or another agency concerned may grant aid towards the 
payment of interest. 
 
Article 20:  The Bank shall adhere to the following operating principles in 
regard to loans and guarantees: 
 
• Ensure that funds are used rationally in the interest of the European 
Community. 
• The Bank may only grant loans or guarantees where the project 
increases economic production and promotes the goal of the common 
market.  Loans and grants in the production sector can be covered by 
the operating profits of the Bank or by a commitment by the State 
where the project is carried out. 
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• The Bank will not gain any interest in or assume any management 
responsibility of a project unless it is required to ensure repayment of 
funds to the Bank. 
• The Bank can dispose of its claims on the capital market and require 
its debtors to issue bonds or other forms of security. 
• The Bank or a Member State cannot require that funds lent by the 
Bank be used in a specific Member State. 
• Loans can be conditional on international tender being arranged. 
• The Bank may not under any circumstances finance a project to be 
carried out in a Member State where the project is opposed by that 
Member State. 
 
Article 21:  Procedures regarding attainment of loans and guarantees: 
 
• Applications can be make to the Bank through the Commission or 
Member State where the project will be carried out. 
• Applications made through the Commission will be submitted to the 
involved Member State for opinion: applications made through a 
Member State will be submitted to the Commission for an opinion. 
• These opinions must be submitted within 2 months of the application, 
no response will indicate to the Bank that there is no objection to the 
project. 
• Applications submitted by the Management Committee will be ruled on 
by the Board of Directors. 
• The Management Committee decides whether submitted applications 
comply with the Statute of the Bank.  If in favor of granting the loan or 
guarantee, the Management Committee, will submit a draft contract to 
the Board of Directors.  If the Management Committee is against an 
application for loan or guarantee, it will also submit this opinion to the 
Board of Directors 
• The Board of Directors cannot grant the loan or guarantee if the 
opinion of the Management Committee is unfavorable, unless it is a 
unanimous decision by the Board of Directors. 
• This policy is the same for The Commission when delivering an 
unfavorable opinion, except when the Board of Directors votes on the 
loan application, the Director nominated by the Commission must 
abstain from the vote. 
• In the event both The Commission and The Management Committee 
deliver unfavorable opinions about the proposed loan or guarantee, the 
Board of Directors may not grant the loan or guarantee. 
 
 
Article 22:  The Bank generates the funds necessary for its purposes by 
borrowing on the international capital markets.  This includes borrowing on 
the capital market of any Member State.  If the Member State does not have 
any legal provisions for this, the Member State and the Bank may reach an 
agreement about the individual loan.  The Member State has the right to 
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refuse to agree to the loan in the event it would cause a disturbance in the 
capital market of that Member State. 
 
Article 23:  The Bank generates funds to meet its obligations by the 
following: 
 
• Investing in money markets 
• Buying and selling securities issued by the Bank or by those who have 
borrowed from it 
• Any financial operation linked to its objectives 
 
The Bank cannot engage in currency arbitrage unless it is required to fulfill its 
obligations.  The Bank will act in agreement with the bank or authorities of 
the concerned Member State. 
 
Article 24:  A reserve fund of 10 percent of the subscribed capital will be 
progressively amassed.  The Board of Directors has the authority to grant 
additional reserves if the liabilities of the Bank justify additional reserves.  
The fund is developed from the interest received from loans granted by the 
Bank.  This reserve fund is separate from the income required to meet the 
Bank’s obligations.  The reserve fund will be invested in manner that allows 
quick availability (liquidity). 
 
Article 25:  The Bank can transfer its assets into the currency from one 
Member State to another Member State to perform its operations.  These 
transfers should be avoided if the Bank already has cash or liquid assets in 
the currency required.  The Bank cannot transfer its assets in the currency of 
a Member State to that of a third country without the Member State’s 
agreement.  The Bank is free to dispose of any of its capital, which is paid up  
in convertible currency, and any currency borrowed on markets outside the 
Community.    Members States are required to make currency available to 
the debtors of the Bank, so that they may repay interest and commissions on 
loans to the Bank. 
 
Article 26: A qualified majority of the Board of Governors may suspend 
service to a Member state if that State fails to meet its obligations to the 
Bank.  These obligations include paying its share of the subscribed capital, 
granting special loans or servicing its borrowers.  This suspension does not 
release the Member State from its obligations to the Bank. 
 
Article 27:  The Board of Governors, in the event of liquidation, will appoint 
the liquidators and instruct them on carrying out the liquidation.  In the 
event of liquidation, the Bank operations will cease, except for those 
processes, which are necessary to preserve its assets and to settle its 
liabilities. 
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Article 28:  The property of the Bank is exempt from any expropriation.    
The Bank will assume the most legal capacities under the law in each of the 
Member State, particularly those laws referring to acquiring and disposing of 
property. 
 
Article 29:  Disputes between the Bank and its creditors, debtors and others 
will be decided by the national courts, except where the jurisdiction lies with 
the Court of Justice.  The Bank will have an address for its service in each 
Member State.  Any property of the Bank is not liable to attachment or 
seizure except by a decision of a court. 
 
Article 30:  The Board of Governors acting unanimously can establish a 
European Investment Fund of which the Bank would be a founding member.  
The Board of Governors would also establish the Statute of The European 
Investment Fund, which would define the objectives, structure, membership, 
financial resources, auditing of the Fund, as well as the relationship between 
the Bank and the Fund.   
 
The Bank would participate in the management of the Fund and contribute to 
its subscribed capital.  The European Community may also become members 
of the Fund and contribute to its subscribed capital.  The invitation to become 
a member is also open to financial institutions. 
 
The protocol regarding privileges of the European Community would apply to 
the Fund and its members.    The Fund is not subject to any form of taxation 
either when in operation or in the event of liquidation or dissolution. 
 
Any dividends, revenue or capital gains to members of the Fund, other than 
the Community and the Bank, will remain subject to applicable legislation.  
The Court of Justice will maintain jurisdiction over disputes within the Fund. 
 
This protocol essentially establishes the European Bank and these 
principles are relatively unchanged, as is the structure the Bank.  Review of 
additional European Union documents will illustrate the minor changes that 
have been instituted with the Bank. 
 
A decision of the representatives of The Governments of the Member 
States on the provisional location of certain institutions and departments of 
the Communities was signed in April 1965 and establishes the location of the 
EIB.  The European Investment Bank will be located in Luxembourg and all 
meetings of the Bank will occur there.  All activities of the Bank will be 
carried out from this location. 
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